Thursday, February 17, 2011
Dewey, Lippmann, Smith & Hyde: Obscure Folk Band or Worst Party Ever?
Monday, February 14, 2011
Visual Analysis, Final Draft: The Elephant in the Room
VISUAL ANALYSIS: Celina Jaitley for PETA, "Beaten, Shackled and Abused."
Wednesday, February 9, 2011
Visual Analysis: Celina Jaitley for PETA
Tuesday, February 8, 2011
Aristotle's Rhetoric: Book II, 12-26
In the 1970s, history, sociology, and indeed most of the liberal arts were rocked by the beginnings of subaltern studies, or the study of everyday people rather than kings, generals and the usual historical figures. Basically, somebody sat down and thought about whether the Renaissance would mean the same thing to the 95% of the population who couldn't read or write. Put in terms of the everyday, most of our big cultural moments (wars excepted) make much less sense. In the same way that our everyday lives are shaped much more by what we understand to be a moral and social status quo than the political minutiae going on in Washington or the arts scene in New York, most of the Greeks living at Aristotle's time were not much concerned with Aristotelian rhetoric, and it rarely touched their lives except through trickledown expressions of power by authorities influenced by Aristotle.
And, indeed, Aristotle had very little to do with and very little use for the poor and the average. Why would a skilled rhetor try to convince anyone without good birth, power, and money -- the people he describes in the latter part of Book II? For Aristotle, a poor person is indeed a person without money. This means Aristotle's conception of a person necessarily involves a certain amount of wealth, power and breeding. A poor person is a person who lacks basic qualities, and Aristotle suggests that their temperaments are simple opposites to his peers and that their emotions can be played upon by offering them what they lack -- offering full personhood.
Offering poor people money or resources or power or prestige usually does work, but not always. Poor people do, in fact, want money, because the rest of Aristotle's society also assumes that "people" have certain amounts of money and prestige and set up society so that everything only works if you start out at Aristotlian levels of personhood. We see this reflected in our own society -- millions of American homeless people cannot access VA and disability benefits to which they are legally entitled because they do not have home addresses at which to receive documents. The American VA and disability benefit system is set up to serve people with homes, because people with homes are the standard. People without homes don't just suffer from a lack -- they're unintelligible to the system.
Could it be that poor people don't just suffer from a simple fixable lack? Could it possibly be that the experience of being poor creates a totally different type of person, only understandable in some ways as lacking -- and most of those lacks created by a system which privileges different resources? Since most homeless people do have possessions, it's usually inappropriate to think of them as simply destitute. In fact, when reintroduced to home life, many homeless people cannot make the shift. Used to sleeping outdoors and to living in large camps of anywhere between a dozen and a hundred others, rehomed homeless people often feel socially isolated and lonely, not to mention claustrophobic. Homes obviously provide health-related benefits like protection from the elements and clean water, but they do not provide enough of those benefits to offset the change in social condition for many people, and returns from state housing to the street are actually incredibly common.
Not having money is not just the opposite of having money. Poor people in our society and for Aristotle are often defined by what they do not have access to, but poor people in Bhutan are defined by being the happiest people in the world by many metrics. There, poverty is equal to happiness, not a preventative factor. In Bhutan, happiness isn't a financially quantifiable phenomenon, except for how wealth complicates life. Poverty is a state in which other life can happen.
Aristotle's obsession with opposites is one of the ancient complications I've never been able to get past. Though Aristotle characterizes some types of people well -- for instance, I think his ideas about the powerful, wealthy and exceptional are probably solid -- opposites don't actually exist in a natural state, and you can't define something by defining its opposite. Defining the lower classes as he does is both inaccurate and kind of lazy.
Today, we still have issues communicating across class boundaries, and the American feminist movement has insane difficulty trying to be inclusive to women of color and women of the lower classes. These women have concerns that the American feminist movement doesn't address and almost can't understand -- decisions upperclass feminists make would be unthinkable or nonsensical to lower-class women. Many American feminists of the upper class choose to raise their children with gender-neutral clothing, environments and toys through early childhood. The decision whether or not to oppress one's child with media-based beauty expectations makes a lot less sense to a woman who knows that her child's social exclusion isn't just a tough circumstance he or she can rise above later in life, but a fatal mistake in a community founded on horizontal connections and solidarity in some ways based on social similarities. Teaching a child to perform masculinity or femininity is a necessary act in these communities, but the assumption by upper class women that the poor are trading empowerment for necessities is probably also false -- this assumption doesn't allow for women very different than the American feminist mainstream to resist gendered oppression in their own way, perhaps by developing different kinds of feminine performance, like the complex Chola figure.